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PRIVACY’S PAST: THE ANCIENT CONCEPT AND 




Privacy is a mysterious concept. The more apparent its significance in 
the real world becomes, the more obscure the core and the limitations of the 
concept become. In the digital age, it is urgent that the legal framework to 
protect privacy should be enhanced more than ever before. At the same time, 
the right-based model of privacy which has long been dominant in theory 
and practice is now challenged by many privacy law experts who propose 
a shift from the right-based model to the trust-based model, a transition 
from the consent-based regime to the expectation-based regime, or from the 
user’s right to control to the fiduciary duties of professionals. This Article 
addresses the current debate and contributes to the ongoing search for a 
new concept of privacy by looking back at privacy’s past. As a legal formula, 
privacy was introduced at the end of the nineteenth century. However, we 
can trace its cultural origin to ancient Greek thought and the idea of a 
distinction between the public and the private realms that was inherent in 
the design and political structure of the polis. Relying on Hannah Arendt’s 
works, this Article draws some critical implications from the ancient idea 
and its modern turn, focusing on both the privative traits and the non-
privative traits of privacy. The argument is that the ancient Greek concept 
of privacy originally suggests a state of being deprived of relationships with 
others, and the implication is that privacy has been a relational concept 
since the beginnings of western political thought. This Article maintains that 
privacy law should seek its foundations in the nature of privacy as a 
component of the human condition, the existential fact that we all live with 
ambivalence between whether to disclose or conceal some aspect of our 
selves to others. This Article proposes that we shift away from thinking of 
privacy in relation to the demand to be “left alone” and think rather about 
the framing of regulative ideals for relation-building. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been the common understanding that the legal concept of 
privacy developed as a contemporary innovation. It is common knowledge 
that Warren & Brandeis’s famous 1890 article1 impressively introduced the 
notion of a right to privacy to the legal world and that this concept became 
one of the most utilized measures in tort law.  
This is true. As a constitutional law scholar, however, I would like to 
consider the fact that the concept equivalent to privacy has roots in the 
modern tradition of liberal thought.2 A basic premise of modern political 
 
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
2. Jeff Weintraub once stated that “the public/private distinction stands out as one of the ‘grand 
dichotomies’ of Western thought.” Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public / Private 
Distinction, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 1 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar 












thought and liberal constitutionalism is that the political community needed 
to be divided into two spheres, the public and the private. Roughly speaking, 
the liberal tradition holds that political powers should be in charge of the 
public sphere, while individual freedom and autonomy are to be preserved 
in the private domain.3 The legal tool that draws boundaries between the 
public and the private is articulated in the form of fundamental rights, and 
among these rights is the concept of privacy. In theory, this concept plays a 
major role in negotiating the lines between public duties and private 
freedoms. In a sense, an ideal of privacy was already incorporated into 
modern constitutional projects from their inception.  
But we can trace the history of a concept of privacy back much further. 
The idea of public/private distinction and a concept like privacy already 
existed in Greek thought and actually functioned in the life of the Polis in 
ancient Greece. The Greek concept of privacy has often been seen as 
socially detrimental and criticized as a form of retreat from society.4 Daniel 
L. Solove articulated the Greek understanding of privacy as follows: “[t]he 
public sphere was the truly important realm of existence; the private sphere 
was valuable solely to the extent that it nourished people for public 
participation.”5 Elsewhere in the same work, Solove also suggests that the 
protection of a realm of solitude in the private sphere is “built into society’s 
structure for a social purpose.”6 To verify this view, Solove cites the famous 
political philosopher Hanna Arendt’s work on Greek thought, asserting that 
“the private sphere was essential to shaping the dimensions and quality of 
life in the public sphere.”7 The passage he cites from Arendt’s work reads:  
A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as 
we would say, shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses the 
quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must 
remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, non-subjective 
sense.8 
By mapping the metaphor of the shallow/deep dichotomy onto that of 
the public/private, Arendt suggests that a life in the private sphere originally 
held its own intrinsic value besides its social role of encouraging vigorous 
participation in public life. What then, according to Arendt, is the nature of 
 
DICTATORSHIP (1989)); see also Raymond Guess, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS (2001). 
3. Distinction of the public and the private is often seen to be equivalent to establishing the 
boundary for the political. However, “the picture is actually more complicated.” Weintraub, supra note 
2, at 2, 2 n.4.  
4. DANIEL L. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 80 (2008). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 164. 
7. Id.  
8. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (2d ed. 1998) (first published by the 
University of Chicago Press in 1958) (emphasis added). 











the value of the private sphere?  
In what follows, I pursue this question by revisiting Arendt’s presentation 
of the public/private dichotomy in Greek thought as laid out in her 
representative work, The Human Condition. My purpose is to expand the 
horizons of legal discourse about the public/private distinction by 
reconsidering the relevance of Arendt’s understanding of the private as a 
source of intrinsic value in Greek social life. Part I introduces the contrast 
between the privative trait of privacy and the non-privative trait of privacy 
and describes the different versions of these traits which were rediscovered 
in the modern age. Part II clarifies the differences and similarities between 
the Greek trait of privacy and the rediscovered traits in the modern age. I 
then move beyond historical inquiry by considering the universal 
implications of concealment and disclosure for human life as baseline 
factors that underlie both ancient and modern concepts of privacy.  
Finally, I suggest some preliminary implications that arise when applying 
Arendt’s reading of the Greek concepts of privacy to privacy law 
scholarship, in particular to the current proposals of “the privacy-as-trust 
school.” In my interpretation, since its inception as a fundamental category 
in political thought, the concept of privacy has been a relational one, not a 
mere justification for the solitude of the individual. I believe that the 
relational aspect of privacy is central to any form of the concept in both 
contemporary states and even in ancient Greek city states, and it also applies 
equally in the digital age and pre-digital age. It is our fate to lead our lives 
in complicated webs of human relationships, and legal forms like contract 
and consensus-based models cannot help but narrow the scope of these 
private relationships. Legal measures cannot regulate or formalize every 
context of daily human relationships. It is necessary to consider this 
underlying reality to uncover the original meaning and value that privacy 
has in our daily life and practice. From this standpoint, the significance of 
the boundary of the public and the private may become clear. By returning 
to Arendt’s insightful reading of the ancient Greek concept of privacy, we 
may be able to discover that the value of privacy is connected to that of 
trust—a basic requirement for maintaining stable intimate relationships. 
This observation suggests the connection between ancient concepts of 
privacy and modern traditions of legal thinking. I conclude by returning to 














I. THE ANCIENT CONCEPT OF PRIVACY AND ITS MODERN TURN 
A. The Privative Trait of Privacy  
In the ancient Greek thought, political community (polis) is not just 
different from but stands in direct opposition to the natural community 
whose center is the home and the family (oikos).9 According to Arendt’s 
analysis, “[t]he distinction between a private and a public sphere of life 
corresponds to the household and the political realms, which have existed 
as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state.”10 
The ancient concept of public/private distinction was based upon this sharp 
contrast between “the household and the political realms.”11 As Arendt says, 
the public and the private existed as “distinct, separate entities,” 12  the 
distinction was so decisive and thorough that there seemed to be no 
interactive space in this formula. At least theoretically, however, this 
decisive arrangement was thought to be an essential prerequisite for the 
establishment of the polis.  
As for the household as the center in the private realm, its driving force 
was life itself, namely, individual maintenance and survival of the species. 
In ancient oikos, “[t]hat individual maintenance should be the task of the 
man and species survival the task of the woman was obvious[.]”13 So the 
household was the place to fulfill “the necessity of life” and the necessity 
ruled over all members and activities in the family.14 To the contrary, the 
realm of polis was the sphere of freedom. Mastering the necessities of life 
would liberate oneself from the household for the realm of polis.15 In that 
realm, people are free and equal. Arendt states “[t]he [polis] was 
distinguished from the household in that it knew only ‘equals,’ whereas the 
household was the center of the strictest inequality.”16 Yes, it was very 
unequal. Only men were eligible to go out of the household and to be free, 
while duties and burdens to satisfy the necessity of life were loaded on 
women and slaves. Only men could fully disclose and even expose their true 
selves by “action (praxis) and speech (lexis),”17 and then they would gain 
 
9. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 24. 
10. Id. at 28. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 30. 
14. Id. at 31, 32. 
15. Id. at 31. 
16. Id. at 32.  
17. Id. at 25, 175–81. Arendt describes action and speech: “while certainly only the foundation 
of the city-state enabled men to spend their whole lives in the political realm, in action and speech, the 
conviction that these two human capacities belonged together and are the highest of all seems to have 
preceded the polis and was already present in pre-Socratic thought.” Id. at 25. By the way, Arendt 
deliberately distinguishes between “labor,” “work,” and “action.” For the details, see id. at 7–8. As for 











the capability to show excellence.18 The public sphere was the place for a 
great self-realization where men could gain freedom (from rule of the 
necessity of life) and disclose their excellence through action and speech. 
The private sphere was not. 
Based on this contrast, Arendt describes a concept of privacy or the 
private which is totally different from the oft-used liberal formula of privacy 
today. Arendt writes: 
In ancient feeling the privative trait of privacy, indicated in the word 
itself, was all-important; it meant literally a state of being deprived 
of something, and even of the highest and most human of man’s 
capacities. A man who lived only a private life, who like the slave 
was not permitted to enter the public realm, or like the barbarian had 
chosen not to establish such a realm, was not fully human.19 
Arendt clearly understands the ancient concept of privacy as “a state of 
being deprived of something,”20 and people (particularly women and slaves) 
relegated to the shadows of the private realm―that is, to the 
household―were deprived of the possibilities for the greatness, excellence, 
and freedom that could be enjoyed by men in the public realm. She calls this 
attribute of privacy “the privative trait of privacy” in the passage cited 
above.21 So, while the household casts a binding spell of the necessity of 
life on members of the family and deprives them of freedom and excellence, 
people (men) in the public sphere could be free through action and speech, 
free from the household, and free to disclose their true selves. In sum, the 
ancient concept of freedom indicates that freedom means a state of having 
no privacy. People can be free when they do not have to hide and are able 
to disclose themselves to others outside the home. This is sharply different 
from the current concept of privacy, in which privacy is thought to protect 
the sphere of freedom. 
 
“action,” Arendt explains, “[a]ction, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the 
intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, 
not Man, live on the earth and inhibit the world.” Id. at 7. Different from other activities, labor and work, 
people have to leave the home and the family and stand in the public realm when they would undertake 
action in Arendt’s sense of the word. Arendt also explains “since action is the political activity par 
excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from 
metaphysical, thought.” Id. at 9. Action alone is a sort of prerogative of man. “[N]either a beast nor a 
god is capable of it.” Id. at 22 (footnote omitted). 
18. In Arendt’s view, “[e]xcellence itself, arete as the Greeks, virtus as the Romans would have 
called it, has always been assigned to the public realm where one could excel, could distinguish oneself 
from all others” and “[e]very activity performed in public can attain an excellence never matched in 
privacy.” Id. at 48–49. 














B. The Non-Privative Trait of Privacy  
1. The Rise of Modern Society 
With the advent of the modern age begun, the social realm emerged as a 
new form of sphere. The rise of the social realm developed, inaugurating a 
different understanding of the public/private distinction and transforming 
both the private and the public realms.  
The emergence of society—the rise of housekeeping, its activities, 
problems, and organizational devices—from the shadowy interior of the 
household into the light of the public sphere has not only blurred the old 
borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond 
recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life 
of the individual and the citizen.22 
Arendt suggests that modern society derived from the household.23 This 
interpretation of modernization implies that modern society was the 
expansion of the family and housekeeping and it developed as government 
took responsibility for a greater share of the core economic tasks of the 
family unit. So, Arendt says “the collective of families economically 
organized into the facsimile of one super-human family is what we call 
‘society,’ and its political form of organization is called ‘nation.’”24 In this 
arrangement, the “nation state” is a territorial manifestation of modern 
society. After all, the process of building society was at the same time the 
process of producing the national community as a kind of extended family 
or “national household.”25 
What made this phenomenon possible was the fact that modern society 
subsumed labor and property from the private sphere through the 
industrialization of the household and the advancement of machine 
technologies. The nation state as a national household also incorporated 
labor and property from the private sphere by taxation. To be sure, modern 
society generally organized labor (through the so-called division of labor) 
such that most people were liberated from the necessity of devoting most of 
their time to the kinds of labor necessary for the maintenance of life.26 
Taking this seriously, however, Arendt points out that “[t]he striking 
coincidence of the rise of society with the decline of the family indicates 
clearly that what actually took place was the absorption of the family unit 




24. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
25. Id. at 44. 
26. Id. at 47. 
27. Id. at 40. 











a self-contained realm of production and reproduction declined in 
significance as society expanded to incorporate the economic functions that 
had once been located in the private domain.28  Likewise, the classical 
concept of the public domain also suffered deterioration due to the rise of 
the social realm. As discussed in Part I.A, the public realm in the ancient 
age was originally the place for men to expose their greatness and 
excellence through their actions and speeches, and Arendt maintains that 
this realm of action was independent from concerns about the necessity of 
life (which were relegated to the private sphere). There was a sharp 
distinction between the public and the private realms and the political solely 
existed in the public realm. But modern society made those clear boundaries 
between the private and the public, and thus the private and the political, 
much less distinct. According to Arendt’s interpretation, the idea “[t]hat 
politics is nothing but a function of society, that action, speech, and thought 
are primarily superstructures upon social interest, is not a discovery of Karl 
Marx but on the contrary is among the axiomatic assumptions Marx 
accepted uncritically from the political economists of the modern age.”29 As 
an arena based on actions, speeches, and thoughts, the political realm (the 
public realm) itself became a comprehensive superstructure upon interests 
and concerns of the social realm, which emerged as an expansion of the 
household in the private realm. So, according to Arendt’s interpretation, the 
rise of modern society entailed a renegotiation of the boundaries between 
the public and private such that the society became increasingly concerned 
with affairs that had traditionally belonged to the private realm of the family 
and household in classical times. Arendt says  
[This] is not a matter of a theory or an ideology, since with the rise 
of society, that is, the rise of the ‘household’ (oikia) or of economic 
activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining 
formerly to the private sphere of the family have become a 
‘collective’ concern.30  
Modern society organized and managed the households and the 
processes to satisfy the necessity of life which were hidden in the private 
realm before,31 and it became the substructure to just reflect the necessity 
of life upon the political (the public) realm as the superstructure. And labor32 
 
28. As for contemporary life, think about working at the company, living in the residential 
complex or the company house, or being on a solo transfer, etc. 
29. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 33 (emphasis added).  
30. Id.  
31. For example, labor-intensive manufacture, factory works, organization of labor union, public 
health, and birth control, etc. 
32. What Arendt means by the term, “labor”, is as follows: “Labor is the activity which 












becomes a major driving force in modern society instead of the ancient 
excellence such as action, speech, and thought. In this way, society as the 
household came to demand that “its members act as though they were 
members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one 
interest.”33 So, it is quite natural for both the private and the public from 
their original meanings to be antagonistic to the social.34  
2. Discovery of Intimacy  
As the social realm expanded and the private realm declined, the nature 
of privacy and the household came to be reconsidered. Modern society 
produced a new understanding of privacy distinct from the ancient concept 
that saw the private realm as characterized by the deprivation of the 
possibility of achieving greatness or excellence. Arendt characterizes this 
shift in the concept of the private as a turn towards the discovery of 
intimacy:  
We no longer think primarily of deprivation when we use the word 
“privacy,” and this is partly due to the enormous enrichment of the 
private sphere through modern individualism. However, it seems 
even more important that modern privacy is at least as sharply 
opposed to the social realm—unknown to the ancients who 
considered its content a private matter—as it is to the political, 
properly speaking. The decisive historical fact is that modern privacy 
in its most relevant function, to shelter the intimate, was discovered 
as the opposite not of the political sphere but of the social, to which 
it is therefore more closely and authentically related.35 
Arendt points out three things in the paragraph above. First, modern 
privacy is understood not in relation to privation,36 the cardinal trait that 
prevailed in the ancient understanding, but rather in relation to “enormous 
 
eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The 
human condition of labor is life itself.” ARENDT, supra note 8, at 7. 
33. Id. at 39. If society subsumes the private and the public and constitutes one enormous family, 
it would be natural course for people to get hot and mad at sexual scandals of public figures and 
celebrities and to urge journalists to disclose their privacies in a body (in one family?) because sexual 
scandals destroy the basic order of the family.  
34. One of the representative theorists criticizing modern society was John Stuart Mill. See JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1884). As Arendt critically analyzes modern society itself, Mill also focuses 
his theory of liberty on a critical analysis of society:”Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority 
was at first, and is still vulgarly held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public 
authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant―society collectively, 
over the separate individuals who compose it―its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts 
which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries.” Id. at 12–13. 
35. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 38 (emphasis added). 
36. In this Article, “privation” means a state of being deprived of something important for 
existence or lack of what is needed for life and existence. 











enrichment.”37 Second, the newly recognized trait of privacy is intimacy. 
Third, the modern concept of the value of privacy as a shelter for intimacy 
was “discovered” by conceiving of the private realm not in opposition to the 
public or political realm, but rather by opposing the private to the newly 
emerging social realm. It is worth noting Arendt’s interpretation does not 
suggest that the advent of modern individualism brought the “enormous 
enrichment” to the private realm. Rather, the perspective of individualism 
which emerged in the modern age made it possible for people to articulate 
the idea that intimacy is a source of enrichment already existing in the 
ancient private realm. More importantly, Arendt maintains that as soon as 
the intimate trait of privacy was discovered in modern society, it was 
immediately impoverished precisely due to the encroachment of the social 
into the private. Once people went out of the private oikos and started 
leading their social lives, they found that the social interfered with the 
private and recognized that the private was the place of intimacy. Thus, 
Arendt writes that “the modern discovery of intimacy seems a flight from 
the whole outer world into the inner subjectivity of the individual, which 
formerly had been sheltered and protected by the private realm.”38 
The oft-repeated observation that modern society invented the intimate 
is arguably incorrect. Intimacy was discovered when modern society came 
to be an enemy of the private. Arendt summarizes this line of thought as 
follows:  
The distinction between the private and public realms, seen from the 
viewpoint of privacy rather than of the body politic, equals the 
distinction between things that should be shown and things that 
should be hidden. Only the modern age, in its rebellion against 
society, has discovered how rich and manifold the realm of the hidden 
can be under the conditions of intimacy.39 
3. The Non-Privative Traits of Privacy: Intimacy, Urgency, and Depth 
It is in describing the rise of modern society and the decline of the private 
realm that Arendt enumerates the non-privative traits of privacy. She writes: 
“[I]t is only natural that the non-privative traits of privacy should appear 
most clearly when men are threatened with deprivation of it.”40 Intimacy is 
arguably the non-privative trait in question.41 In order to understand this 
 
37. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 38. 
38. Id. at 69. 
39. Id. at 72. 
40. Id. at 71.  
41. Arendt does not explicitly say that intimacy is one of the non-privative traits of privacy. But 












non-privative trait more properly and the danger to human existence when 
this trait is lost, Arendt argues that it may be best to consider two non-
privative traits of privacy which are older than, and independent of, the 
discovery of intimacy.  
First, Arendt argues that the classical concept of the private realm is 
characterized by the urgency of meeting the necessities required to sustain 
life.42 From the standpoint of the public realm, the necessity of life can be 
understood as a negative trait of the private realm in that the necessities of 
life place limitations upon freedom to the extent that one must labor (in 
private) to meet the biological necessities of survival. Arendt insists, 
however, that the necessity of life “possesses a driving force whose urgency 
is unmatched by the so-called higher desires and aspirations of man,” and 
“it will also prevent the apathy and disappearance of initiative” that may 
arise in a community which is very wealthy and has no fear of poverty.43  
Second, Arendt refers to the quality of depth that can be enjoyed only in 
private life, within “the four walls of one’s private property.”44 Arendt states 
that “the four walls” offer “the only reliable hiding place from the common 
public world” and thereby protect the “second outstanding non-privative 
characteristic of privacy.”45 On the other hand, in the paragraph I cited in 
the INTRODUCTION of this Article, Arendt maintains that a life spent entirely 
in the public will be shallow and it must be hidden in the private in order to 
retain its depth. 46  Putting these arguments together, the second non-
privative trait of privacy is the quality of depth which can only be possible 
in a space hidden or protected from public view within the household. 
Excessive exposure to the public gaze risks eviscerating the depth of life. 
Outside the hidden place, the depth of life gets shallow. 
A closer look at these non-privative traits, urgency and depth, will be 
helpful for drawing out implications for further inquiry. With respect to the 
former, we have to ask why the urgency of satisfying the necessities 
required for life is greater than the urgency of satisfying the need for 
personal greatness that can only be satisfied through public exhibition. To 
this question, Arendt offers no explicit answer. She suggests, however, that 
the hidden has long been thought to maintain linkage with human life and 
body when she says that “from the beginning of history to our own time it 
has always been the bodily part of human existence that needed to be hidden 
in privacy, all things connected with the necessity of the life process 
 
based on other two traits of privacy―urgency of satisfying the necessities of life and depth of life 
(sacredness of birth and death)―which Arendt explicitly sees as non-private ones. 
42. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 70–71. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 71. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 











itself.”47 And Arendt clarifies that the hidden assumes a sort of sanctity: 
The sacredness of this privacy was like the sacredness of the hidden, 
namely, of birth and death, the beginning and end of the mortals who, 
like all living creatures, grow out of and return to the darkness of an 
underworld. The non-privative trait of the household realm originally 
lay in its being the realm of birth and death which must be hidden 
from the public realm because it harbors the things hidden from 
human eyes and impenetrable to human knowledge. It is hidden 
because man does not know where he comes from when he is born 
and where he goes when he dies.48 
In this analysis, the urgency associated with the necessities of life in the 
private realm is based upon the sacredness of the realm of birth and death. 
Therefore it would be much more appropriate to say that the non-privative 
trait of privacy lies in the sanctity of the realm of birth and death rather than 
the urgency of the realm of necessity of life. Sanctity must be hidden in the 
household while greatness or excellence must be exposed in the public 
realm. In the modern age, many activities associated with birth and death 
take place in social spaces such as hospitals, clinics, nursing homes, 
rehabilitation facilities, hospices, hotels, psychiatrist’s offices, and so on. 
These places are associated with the hidden or the private in some parts of 
them because even now they still maintain some spaces for the sanctity of 
birth and death like the household, in other words, they are the places of 
privacy.  
The second non-privative trait, depth, is perhaps more relevant for this 
Article. What is the nature of this quality of the private realm―a trait is 
deep when hidden and shallow when disclosed? Is it the sanctity of life and 
death? On the other hand, political greatness and excellence go the opposite 
way. These traits can only flourish in the public realm and under the 
collective gaze, but such greatness is not possible for those hidden in the 
private realm. Regarding these points, Arendt gives no clear answer. As 
seen above, she only suggests that the distinction between the private and 
public realms equals the distinction between things that should be disclosed 
and things that should be hidden and also that a life must be hidden in the 
private in order to retain its depth. In line with this arrangement, it appears 
that greatness and excellence require actions to be exposed to a public 
audience while the sanctity of life and death must remain hidden to be 
protected. In Arendt’s interpretation of the classical structure of the 
public/private divide, it appears that the territory between public and private 
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can be indexed to the binaries of disclosure/concealment and 
excellence/sanctity. The system of associations appears clear and simple. 
However, the picture so far is inadequate for grasping the messy realities 
and complexities of human life because it pays little attention to the fact that 
we all live in ambivalence between disclosure and concealment.  
II. AMBIVALENCE OF DISCLOSURE AND CONCEALMENT 
A. From Binary Concept to Ambivalent Concept 
1. The ‘Disclosure-for-Greatness/Concealment-for-Sanctity’ Solution 
is Not the Answer 
“Disclosure-for-greatness/concealment-for-sanctity” solution is so lucid 
and simple that it almost looks like a binary scale. Needless to say, human 
life is not easily mapped onto binaries. Even if a binary solution is useful 
for formulating a theoretical framework, the application to real life may not 
prove easy or helpful. I think there are two main reasons why “disclosure 
for greatness/concealment for sanctity” solution is not promising.  
First, where has intimacy gone in this binary framework? As I referred 
to earlier, Arendt pointed out that intimacy was “discovered” in the modern 
age and implied intimacy was one of the non-privative traits of privacy. 
Arendt also states, however, that in order to understand how dangerous the 
loss of the private realm may be, we need to go beyond intimacy and take a 
closer look at other non-privative traits: it is here that the concepts of 
urgency, the sanctity of life and death, and the depth of private life enter the 
picture.49 Intimacy in a narrow sense is decomposed into these non-privative 
values. Arendt contrasts these non-privative values attributed to the private 
realm with the perfectionistic values of greatness and excellence attributed 
to the public realm. Perfectionistic values (like greatness and excellence) 
and sacred values (like the sanctity of life and death) are placed at either end 
of a gradation or sliding scale of human values.50  Both the values are 
extremes or climax states. To be sure, Arendt tends to illustrate her 
philosophical picture by deliberately using sharp contrasts, clear-cut 
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frameworks, and these climax states. For the topic of this Article, however, 
the entire spectrum of human values, not merely the poles at both ends of 
the gradation, are more relevant. That means we need a comprehensive and 
general theory of the disclosure/concealment issue as we face it in our daily 
lives, not just on special occasions like glorious times, such as life, and death.  
Second, the social realm has caused the binary distinction to lose its 
validity or usefulness. Arendt observed that when the social realm emerged 
in the modern age both the public realm and the private were absorbed into 
modern society.51 In this picture, the “disclosure for greatness/concealment 
for sanctity” construction of the respective values in play in the 
public/private distinction breaks down because the social realm where we 
live no longer needs clear boundaries between the public and the private.  
The world we live in is not neatly divided in a binary way just between 
two spaces, the public and the private. The values we hold are not simple 
enough to be accounted for by these opposing poles. The distinction of 
disclosure and concealment cannot be rendered as a binary. Rather, we live 
in the ambivalent spaces between disclosure and concealment every day. 
We are urged constantly to make decisions about what should be disclosed 
to the public and what should be hidden in the private in every aspect of our 
lives.  
2. Empirical and Existential Basis of the Ambivalence of Disclosure 
and Concealment 
How does the ambivalence of disclosure and concealment work in our 
lives? This may appear as something self-evident. For example, Patricia 
Meyer Spacks writes: “Each of us establishes individual boundaries of 
privacy; each of us may willingly, even happily abandon privacy in different 
specific contexts. In practice, then, privacy carries in modern Western 
culture no fixed assignment of value. Sometimes we want the state it 
designates, sometimes we don’t.”52  
We usually entrench ourselves in a wall of privacy. But we sometimes 
willingly, happily, deliberatively, or strategically disclose privacy to 
specific persons, on specific occasions, or in specific contexts. Spacks’s 
statement above suggests that there are two kinds of empirical truth or 
existential basis of the ambivalence of disclosure and concealment. First: 
everyone has her/his secrets. Second: people sometimes deliberately 
disclose their secrets, even desiring to do so on some occasions.  
Alan F. Westin implies this empirical or existential basis of the 
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ambivalence from a different angle when he referred to “desire for privacy” 
as follows: “The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since 
participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus, each individual 
is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he 
balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and 
communication of himself to others.”53  
If Westin’s observation is correct, and I believe it is so, then we are 
required daily to balance two desires: the desire to keep something hidden 
and the desire to share or disclose ourselves. This is precisely what the 
ambivalence of disclosure and concealment means and requires us to do 
every day. However, there are further questions to be asked: Why do we 
desire to participate in society by going so far as to abandon privacy? Why 
is “the desire for disclosure” so powerful? How does “a personal adjustment 
process” work? Why do we “willingly, even happily” abandon our privacy? 
In order to solve those issues, it is not sufficient to appeal to empirical 
evidence or existential conditions―a philosophical inquiry will be needed. 
B. A Philosophical Explanation on the Ambivalence of Privacy  
1. Another Privative Trait of Privacy: Privation of Others 
Here again, Arendt’s works will help us to find a philosophical basis of 
the ambivalence of disclosure and concealment. She firstly pointed out the 
privative trait of privacy as a state of being deprived of greatness or 
excellence in the household.54 On the other hand, Arendt refers to another 
privative trait of privacy when she states as follows:  
To live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of 
things essential to a truly human life: to be deprived of the reality that 
comes from being seen and heard by others, to be deprived of an 
“objective” relationship with them that comes from being related to 
and separated from them through the intermediary of a common 
world of things, to be deprived of the possibility of achieving 
something more permanent than life itself. The privation of privacy 
lies in the absence of others; as far as they are concerned, private man 
does not appear, and therefore it is as though he did not exist.55  
Arendt says that the privative trait of privacy, different from the privation 
of greatness or excellence, lies in the state of being deprived of “others.”56 
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The privation of others also means the privation of one’s own “reality.” 
Arendt also says: 
The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear 
assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves, and while the 
intimacy of a fully developed private life, such as had never been 
known before the rise of the modern age and the concomitant decline 
of the public realm, will always greatly intensify and enrich the whole 
scale of subjective emotions and private feelings, this intensification 
will always come to pass at the expense of the assurance of the reality 
of the world and men.57 
Private life cannot be actualized until it is seen or heard by others. Our 
life can gain its reality only through being with others. Because being 
deprived of others means being deprived of the reality of life at the same 
time, a life relegated entirely to the private realm without the company of 
others will be tantamount to a fantasy life. In the passage cited above, 
Arendt states that the privation of others is a privation of “an objective 
relationship.”58 When we try to give a reality to our private life, we need to 
overcome the privation of others by forming objective relationships with 
others. In the ancient age, relationships were provided by the household. 
Women and slaves sacrificed participation in the public realm, but they may 
have been able to experience relationships albeit confined within the family 
as a self-contained unit. As I referred to, however, the modern age broke the 
spell of the necessity of life and released people from the household, so that 
people took a step forward to modern society to find others who give a life 
reality and form relationships with others.59 People started wandering about 
the social realm beyond the unclear boundary of the private and public 
realms and searching for others and relationships with them.60 In this sense, 
privation of others may provide a motivation for one to invite people to 
engage in the social realm, and through this process of relation building, 
people may move from solitude to fulfilling relationships. This means that 
precisely due to the deprivation of others, the realm of privacy somehow 
contains within itself the motivation for connecting with others and building 
relationships. Relationships are internalized within privacy itself. 
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The privation of others differs from the privation of greatness or 
excellence. But, when the ancient Greek citizen sought to demonstrate his 
greatness or excellence, he had to engage in actions before an audience. He 
needed to be seen and heard by others. It would have been essential for the 
ancient to show his greatness before others in society in order to give reality 
to his perfectionistic fantasy. If it is the case, then the privation of others 
(relationships and the possibility for reality they create) appears to be the 
most fundamental or universal privative trait of privacy.  
2. Another Non-Privative Trait of Privacy: The Conception of Good 
Does it follow that privately held desires must be completely disclosed 
to the public when we decide to form relationships with others? My answer 
to this question is negative. As mentioned above, Arendt argues that the 
non-privative part of privacy maintains its depth when it is hidden but 
becomes shallow when it is disclosed. If so, it would be wrong to think that 
the desires harbored in the inner world must be disclosed and opened to 
public display as a prerequisite for forming relationships. It is only by their 
concealment from others that some private desires maintain the capacity to 
nourish the self. What does this mean? Arendt writes: 
Yet there are a great many things which cannot withstand the 
implacable, bright light of the constant presence of others on the 
public scene; there, only what is considered to be relevant, worthy of 
being seen or heard, can be tolerated, so that the irrelevant becomes 
automatically a private matter. This, to be sure, does not mean that 
private concerns are generally irrelevant; on the contrary, we shall 
see that there are very relevant matters which can survive only in the 
realm of the private. For instance, love, in distinction from friendship, 
is killed, or rather extinguished, the moment it is displayed in 
public.61 
What are the “relevant matters” which “cannot withstand the implacable, 
bright light” of the public realm? Arendt locates the source of the good in 
the private realm: “Only goodness must go into absolute hiding and flee all 
appearance if it is not to be destroyed.”62 
In Arendt’s interpretation, part of the necessity for protecting the private 
realm from “the implacable, bright light” of the public gaze arises because 
the private realm is the site of intimate personal relationships and as such a 
primary source of conceptions63 of the good. In The Human Condition, 
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Arendt does not define the good but she uses the terms “good” or “goodness” 
in a limited way. For example, it appears that romantic love, religious 
beliefs, and good deeds constitute the generally Christian sense of the good 
that informs Arendt’s concept.64 For my purposes, I will suggest that the list 
of goods that flourish in the private realm but recede in “the implacable, 
bright light” of the public realm includes more than just romantic love, 
religious beliefs, and so on. Can we not add to this list other goods such as 
personal desires, life goals, pleasure, affection, friendship, ambition, 
cherished possessions, or secret fantasies, which are similarly fragile and 
vulnerable when exposed in the public light? Moving forward, I would like 
to use the term good in a general way.65 Thus, I maintain that a further non-
privative trait of privacy (beyond intimacy), as Arendt stated that it becomes 
deeper when hidden but becomes shallow when disclosed, is precisely 
personal conceptions of the good.  
It is sometimes said that the conception of good has nothing to do with 
selfishness or altruism. If we love somebody, the benefits or pleasures 
attained from that love are not just for the sake of the lover but also for the 
sake of the beloved one. The goods derived from love and friendship are 
shared by lovers and friends. This also suggests that whomever love and 
friendship are for the sake of, as Charles Fried once said, “these things are 
good in themselves.”66 But this does not mean the conception of good life 
shall not be personal or private but be public. It is still personal because, 
again, in Fried’s words: “And still all of these goods―high and low, selfish 
and generous―are sought by us because of what we judge them to be. They 
are our goods.”67 
So an individual’s conception of the good is still personal and some 
component of this ideal should be hidden in the private realm in order to 
keep its non-privative trait of depth of life from the light of the public realm. 
Even so, however, the privation of others as the privative trait of privacy 
would be applied to an individual’s conceptions of the good too. As far as 
these conceptions are situated in the state of privation of others, they need 
to be nurtured by relationships with others to attain a kind of objective 
reality and to become more than a fantasy or imaginary wish fulfillment. 
Could a person be satisfied with life without trying to test and enact her or 
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his values outside the household or their inner world? A completely personal 
conception of the good without reality that comes from relationships with 
others amounts to a fantasy. Arendt describes the situation like this:  
[Y]et only solitude can become an authentic way of life in the figure 
of the philosopher, whereas the much more general experience of 
loneliness is so contradictory to the human condition of plurality that 
it is simply unbearable for any length of time and needs the company 
of God, the only imaginable witness of good works, if it is not to 
annihilate human existence altogether.68 
A person in love with their own conceptions of the good may appear to 
share something of the devotion of the religious. Arendt maintains that some 
philosophers may be satisfied to dwell in solitude, apart from humanity, but 
even they rely on a sense of extra-human reality that provides the kind of 
sustenance that relationships with others can bring.69 Aside from monastic 
or philosophical recluses ordinary persons cannot generally rely upon the 
sense of God’s company to fulfill their needs for companionship, and most 
people need to form relationships with others in order to live lives of value 
in which they may try to put their conceptions of the good into practice 
through actions.  
All things considered, the implications of the privative/non-privative 
traits of privacy break down as follows: we are not so independent or 
monistic as to find satisfaction from merely contemplating the good in 
solitude without hope of somehow impacting the world of other persons. In 
such a completely isolated private life, the individual would be deprived of 
others and of the sense of his or her own reality. That would place our 
conceptions of the good in a state of privation too. People look for others in 
the social realm and form relationships with them in order to bring reality 
to their own conceptions of the good as a personal project. In sum, we need 
to give a chance to our conceptions of the good and test them to learn 
whether or not our values are truly good for us.  
On the other hand, the arrangement above does not mean personal 
conceptions of the good can be completely exposed in the public realm. 
These conceptions still need to be protected as, for example, intimate 
matters not fully open to the public or the social. To balance between 
concealment and disclosure of the conceptions of good, it is necessary to 
test different values in the course of intimate relationships with others must 
be protected from “the implacable, bright light” of the outer world. Privacy 
as a legal measure has bearing on precisely this point.70  
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT LAW OF PRIVACY 
A. Space and Architecture: Privacy as the Four Walls 
The first lesson we learned from the ancient concept of privacy is that 
privacy was deeply connected with the matters of space and architecture. As 
Arendt described, the house as “the four walls” offered “the only reliable 
hiding place from the common public world.”71 The spatial and architectural 
privacy is still important today. In Boyd v. United States, one of the earliest 
references to privacy in the United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments ought to be protections against all 
governmental invasions “of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies 
of life” and that “[i]t is not the breaking of his doors . . . , that constitutes 
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”72  
In Katz v. United States, in which the Court considered the 
constitutionality of “evidence of the petitioner’s end of the conversation 
overheard by an FBI agent who attached an electronic . . . device to the 
outside of a telephone booth,”73 Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the 
Court:  
[b]ecause of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the 
parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the 
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The 
petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a 
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“constitutionally protected area.” The Government has maintained 
with equal vigor that it was not.74  
Justice Stewart then concluded: “[b]ut this effort to decide whether or not a 
given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects 
attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”75 
This passage implies that the concept of privacy took its leave of the 
spatial concept. However, in his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan 
raised an objection to Justice Stewart: “As the Court’s opinion states, ‘the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.’ The question, however, is 
what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to 
that question requires reference to a ‘place.’”76 
Based upon this view, Harlan formulated the so-called Harlan test as a 
twofold standard for protection of privacy: “first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”77 
Applying the test to the case, Harlan concluded that “[t]he point is not that 
the booth is ‘accessible to the public’ at other times, . . . , but that it is a 
temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of 
freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”78 The spatial and 
architectural concept of privacy still works.  
B. Sanctity of Life and Death 
Again, Arendt said that in the ancient age the sacredness of privacy “was 
like the sacredness of the hidden, namely, of birth and death, the beginning 
and end of the mortals who, like all living creatures, grow out of and return 
to the darkness of an underworld.” 79  From this view, she understands 
sanctity as the non-privative trait of the private realm which “originally lay 
in its being the realm of birth and death which must be hidden from the 
public realm.”80 
This concept of privacy as sanctity of life and death is still vigorous in 
the Supreme Court’s opinions. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
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Justice Douglas asked: “[w]ould we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives?” 81  He then responded negatively to this question by 
recognizing a constitutional guarantee of “the notion of privacy surrounding 
the marriage relationship.”82 Following Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird held 
that “[i]f, under Griswold, . . . the distribution of contraceptives to married 
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons 
would be equally impermissible” and that “[i]t is true that, in Griswold, the 
right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship.”83 And Roe 
v. Wade introduced the right to abortion as part of the right to privacy.84 The 
fact that the Supreme Court has considered reproduction as a function of 
privacy is also quite suggestive of an implicit connection between privacy 
and sanctity of life.85  
C. Relationship with Others 
Probably, for the current law of privacy, the most important implications 
from the ancient concept of privacy and its modern turn are ambivalence of 
the privative trait and the non-privative trait of privacy. Before referring to 
the implications, I would like to summarize the analyses and interpretations 
in the previous Parts:  
――Privacy originally means a state of being deprived of something.  
――In the ancient concept of privacy, what was deprived of in the 
private realm was the possibilities of achieving greatness or 
excellence. As both the public and the private realms came to be 
absorbed into the social realm in the modern age, intimacy or depth 
of life in the private realm were discovered as the trait of privacy 
instead of perfectionist ones of greatness or excellence. But what 
makes a life in the household intimate or deep? It would still be 
necessary to inquire into what the fundamental characters of life in 
the private realm are. Analysis in the previous Parts suggests that 
there are twofold characters in the private realm, privation of others 
as the privative trait of privacy and personal conceptions of the good 
in life as the non-privative trait of privacy.  
――To live in a state of privation of others in the household also 
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means to live in a state of being deprived of the reality that comes 
from being seen and heard by others, and being deprived of an 
objective relationship with others. If we would achieve something 
more than meeting the necessities of life and give reality to our lives, 
we have to go out of the household and enter society in order to 
compensate privation of others and build relationships with them. 
――Each one of us has her or his own conceptions of the good or the 
good life. These conceptions are usually hidden and protected in the 
private realm because the good “cannot withstand the implacable, 
bright light” of the public realm. However, the supplementary 
principle of filling up privation of others shall also be applied to these 
personal conceptions of the good. Therefore, while we would give 
reality to our personal conceptions of the good by building 
relationship to share those conceptions with others, those 
relationships still need to be hidden and protected by privacy. 
Furthermore, personal conceptions of the good bear ambivalence of 
both the momentums to be concealed in the inner world and to be 
disclosed to others. 
――The ancient meaning of privacy is a state of privation of others, 
and the privation has to be filled up with relationship with them. From 
this perspective, privacy internalizes the concept of relationship in its 
original trait. We enter the society with this relational concept of 
privacy and live the ambivalence between concealment and 
disclosure of personal conceptions of the good. 
――Privacy is originally the relational concept, in other words, the 
social concept. 
Several implications for the law of privacy could be delivered from the 
analyses and interpretations above.  
First, as far as we understand privacy as the relational concept, the 
classical formula of privacy, the right to be let alone,86 is misleading. Taken 
literally, this formula only justifies a state of solitude without others or living 
with just imaginary others including God in mind. These kinds of personal 
lives shall be protected not by privacy but rather by freedom of conscience 
or religious belief.  
Second, as mentioned in Part III.A, privacy as the spatial concept is still 
important today; however, from the perspective of privacy as the relational 
concept, it has a certain limitation because we need to go out of the closed 
household protected by “the four walls” to form relationships with others 
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outside. In this sense, Justice Stewart’s statement in Katz that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places” is very suggestive.87 On the other 
hand, in his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan, asking Stewart “what 
protection it affords to those people,” states that “the answer to that question 
requires reference to a ‘place’” is also suggestive.88 We still need a solid 
protection provided by the spatial concept of privacy. But, what “the four 
walls” means has largely changed today. In some cases, the spatial concept 
of privacy and the relational concept of privacy are mutually complementary.  
Third, even if privacy originally means privation of others, filling up the 
privation does not necessarily mean abandoning privacy. It is because 
people will not place their privacy entirely in the public realm when they 
disclose their privacy to the others. Privacy as the relational concept is 
exclusively disclosed only to specific others. In the society where the 
boundary of the public and the private is ambiguous and intertwined, we 
can only contextually decide what and how much to disclose or conceal and 
to whom. With regard to this point, it is worth noting that privacy plays 
important roles not just in protecting what is to be hidden but also in making 
it possible to disclose it. In order to give reality to personal conceptions of 
the good, people need to form relationships with others. When people 
attempt to establish a relationship with someone, they use privacy or secrecy 
like a token or currency to earn intimacy.89 Probably partners would attempt 
to do the same thing by using their privacy in the same way. By sharing 
privacy with others, people can safely start testing their own conceptions of 
the good in the society. Consequentially, the web of various relationships of 
sharing privacy in society has to be protected from the light of the social 
and public realms by some measures. The law of privacy might as well 
reflect an existential truth that people sometimes hide their secrets but 
sometimes love to disclose them, and has to recognize the necessity of 
protecting ambivalence of concealment and disclosure, instead of the binary 
distinction of the private and the public. 
D. For the Current Development of Privacy-as-Trust Scholarship 
The relational or social concept of privacy may provide a strong 
foundation to the current movement in privacy law to reinforce the idea of 
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Privacy law started its development from a legal measure in law of torts 
when Warren and Brandeis’s classic formula of privacy was introduced90. 
The main goal of this measure was to restrain the harms inflicted by the 
entrenchment of “the right to be let alone” as a classic concept of privacy 
which is formed on extension of protection against interference with life and 
property.91 With the advent of the age of information followed by the digital 
revolution, a new conceptualization of privacy became powerful: the 
concept of information privacy.92 Along this line, the legal measure for 
privacy has shifted focus from tort claims to the right to control one’s 
personal information and its dissemination in society.93 The idea of privacy 
as information control has been very powerful, not just in the United States 
but at the international level.94 With the rise of digital society, however, this 
idea is becoming unhelpful in many of our transactions, and it bears the risk 
of making things worse.  
As for the fate of this idea, Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog describe 
the expected purpose and role of the notion that the right to privacy entails 
the right to information control by saying that “[i]n this context, privacy 
means the rules governing the collection, use, and disclosure of information” 
and that “privacy rules should encourage and fortify information 
relationships.”95 So they insist that privacy rules should build trust in these 
relationships. However, “[r]ather than encouraging trust, modern American 
privacy law encourages companies to profit in short-sighted ways by 
extracting as much value as possible from personal data in the short term” 
and “they are essentially free to set up the terms of information relationships 
any way they wish.” 96  Along this line, Richards and Hartzog strongly 
criticize the control-based model of privacy:  
Companies have this power because of a second hallmark of modern 
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American privacy law, its reliance on a control-based regime of 
“notice and choice.” Under this arrangement, terms are hidden in the 
fine print of legal notices virtually no one reads, and there is as little 
meaningful choice as in old-fashioned consumer adhesion contracts. 
Consumers are left exposed and bewildered, lamenting what they see 
as the “death of privacy.”97 
Rapid development of information technologies also seems to be 
accelerating this alleged “death of privacy.” Ordinary users have little 
knowledge about what happens with information that enters the Internet via 
ubiquitous electronic devices. But Internet business entities like Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and IT engineers know very well what happens 
with this information. The gap in knowledge between users and IT 
professionals makes the contract-based model of privacy obsolete because 
the knowledge asymmetry deprives users of opportunities to have second 
thoughts about entering digital transactions, and this lack of knowledge 
undermines the well-informed consent on which such contractual 
transactions have heretofore been based. Furthermore, the knowledge 
asymmetry produces and even broadens the power asymmetry between 
users and IT companies. The asymmetry and imbalance of power and 
knowledge makes people vulnerable in their IT life, and many express 
discomfort (even feel creepy) about the excessively digitized environment.98 
Vulnerability and discomfort (creepiness) cannot be provided legal 
remedies through traditional means like tort claims and injunctions because 
they do not cause any direct and immediate infringement of rights.99 
In order to “mitigate the vulnerabilities and power imbalance in sharing 
information with others”100  in the digital age, the trust-based model of 
privacy has been intensively introduced by many influential scholars.101 As 
seen above, both “the Harm Principle that derives from tort law and the 
Control Principle that comes from FIPs (the Fair Information Practices) are 
the legal bedrock of modern privacy law.”102 But both of them will not work 
well for users and come to be the bedrock of, in Richards and Hartzog’s 
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term, Privacy Pessimism.103 Consequently, the Harm Fixation104 and the 
Control Illusion105 has to be transformed to a new arrangement, the trust-
based model of privacy. The transformations shall occur in many ways: 
from the right-based model to the trust-based model, from the consent-based 
regime to the expectation-based regime, from the user’s right to control and 
to make choices to the fiduciary duties of professionals.106 
With these in the background, the privacy-as-trust model may become 
the most promising alternative to the rights-based model of privacy. I think 
it is clear that considerations and interpretations in this Article would 
contribute to the privacy-as-trust scholarship by offering philosophical 
answers to the fundamental question about why trust is important in the field 
of privacy law. 
First, thinking of privacy as a relational concept or as a social concept in 
the manner proposed here offers theoretical foundations for the idea of 
privacy-as-trust. To explain this, it may suffice to cite Waldman’s statement 
below: 
We need to change our perspective on privacy. 
It may sound strange, but privacy is an inherently social concept. The 
very idea of privacy presumes that we exist in both formal and 
informal relationships with others: privacy only matters after we 
share within those relationships. When making sharing decisions, we 
rely on and develop expectations about what should happen to our 
information based on the contexts in which we share, thus integrating 
privacy into our lives relative to other people.107  
Here is another important statement. In a short passage, Woodrow Hartzog 
says: “[t]rust is an essential component of healthy relationship and healthy 
societies.”108  
These passages are standing for a social function of privacy. Privacy 
needs objective relationships with others because we are inclined to give 
reality to personal conceptions of the good by filling up privation of others 
in the private realm. So Waldman is right and correct when he says “privacy 
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only matters after we share within those relationships.”109 Privacy shall 
protect people’s freedom not from, but for others and for society at large.  
Second, consideration of the ambivalence between the needs for 
disclosure and concealment will encourage deeper reflection on the nature 
of trust-based relationships. When Hartzog proposes three privacy-related 
values (trust, obscurity, and autonomy), he refers to how the first two values, 
trust and obscurity, relate to each other:  
Obscurity and trust let us explore and create identity and be intimate 
with each other because they create zones of safety. They can be 
combined to give us holistic protection. Trust protects us when 
dealing with other people. Obscurity protects us when there are no 
people we can trust. Most important, they are both related to the large 
moral value of autonomy.110  
The value of obscurity is ambivalent because it is of course not perfect 
exposure but not complete disappearance either. Even if you have someone 
you trust and both of you are entering the trust-based relationship, unless 
obscurity protects those relationships, trust may become fragile. These 
ambivalent and complicated characteristics of trust and obscurity come 
from the inherent traits of privacy: ambivalence of disclosure and 
concealment.  
CONCLUSION 
The next step shall be to reflect the idea of privacy-as-trust upon 
legislation and policy making. The implications of this Article may provide 
theoretical support for this movement. Even so, the classical and modern 
concepts of privacy, including the spatial concept of privacy and the right to 
control over personal information, must still play important roles in 
protecting human life. All modes of legal measures such as “the four walls,” 
the right to control, the fiduciary duties, and reasonable/subjective 
expectations,111 should work differently in response to every context of 
matters of privacy. Or, if a rapid and considerable development of 
technology like data portability empowers IT users and solves technological 
asymmetry between users and IT platforms, the right to control over 
information might gain the technological tools to actualize the control. If so, 
while we see the trust-based model of privacy prevalent in the transactions 
of daily life, we might also see that data portability revives the right-based 
or control-based model of privacy again in the near future.  
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In closing, I propose a possible further step for the development of 
political and legal theory surrounding the role of privacy in contemporary 
society. For this purpose, I will return to Arendt. As seen in Part I.B, for 
Arendt, the social realm was antagonistic to both the public and the private 
realms. I think Arendt’s view of modern society seems somewhat negative, 
illiberal, and even pessimistic in some contexts.112 She actually describes 
modern society as a machine of exploitation that squeezes labor and 
property from the household and destroys the virtues of both the private and 
public (political) realm. In Crises of the Republic, her criticism of society 
seems to be made more severe in that it takes the form of a criticism of 
industrial society, capitalism, and socialism. She says: 
In that case one must say that capitalism has destroyed the estates, 
the corporations, the guilds, the whole structure of the feudal society. 
It has done away with all the collective groups which were a 
protection for the individual and for his property, which guaranteed 
him a certain security though not, of course, complete safety. In their 
place it has put the “classes,” essentially just two: the exploiters and 
the exploited.113  
Combining her interpretations of the society in The Human Condition 
and Crises of the Republic, almost all societies have long been exploiting 
something from the private realm. In the modern age, they exploited “labor” 
and “property” from the private realm. Today, however, societies exploit not 
just labor and property but also “information” from all of us. Limitless 
exploitation of information keeps building a gigantic accumulation of 
personal data and privacy. We might live in a society divided between the 
exploiters (IT platforms) and the exploited (users). So, if we want to take 
privacy seriously, the further step for privacy law must be critical inquiry 
into the nature of society itself. 
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